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Is Coalition Bargaining Legal?
LABOR LEADERS throughout the country may soon be echoing anAl Capp cartoon character's slogan, "What's good for General
Bullmoose is good for the U.S.A." In real life it is one of Bull-
moose's economic counterparts, the General Electric Company,
which may inadvertently be determining what's "good for the coun-
try" or at least what's good for labor. Of course, in the eyes of
labor leaders, the two are synonomous.
General Electric (GE), which traditionally has its share of labor
problems,1 is currently embroiled in a bitter dispute with several
labor unions over the legality of a phenomenon new to the labor
scene and known as "coalition" bargaining. In simplest terms,
"coalition" bargaining means a type of negotiation where all unions
which bargain with a particular employer or group of employers
present identical demands in unison, negotiating for a common con-
tract for all. This type of bargaining is concededly legal when the
I Most prominent among GE's problems has been labor's attack on the alleged
"take it or leave it" attitude of GE negotiators. This refers to the company policy of
determining the best possible package it can afford to offer its workers, then setting
this offer on the contract table with nothing held back in reserve for "concessions."
The company has also followed the practice of communicating its contract offers di-
rectly to the workers in hopes that they will influence the union leadership to accept
them. In 1960, officials of the IWE challenged this practice by charging that GE had
refused to bargain within the meaning of § 8(a) (5) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Star. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964)
[hereinafter cited as LMRA]. In a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board,
General Elec. Co., 57 LR.1R.M. 1491 (1964), counsel for the WUE argued that the
practice amounted to an undermining of the union leadership through by-passing it with
an offer made directly to the employees and through a refusal to bargain about wages,
hours, and conditions of employment - all "mandatory" subjects of bargaining under
the act. Id. at 1498, 1501. The NLRB found that the company's bargaining tactics
were tantamount to bad faith and therefore amounted to a refusal to bargain. Id. at
1500. On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals it was determined that
the action should be heard by the Second Circuit. IUE v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 327 (D.C.
Cit. 1965). The Second Circuit granted GE's motion to intervene and dismissed a
union petition for review in a series of unreported motions. These determinations,
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, were vacated and remanded. IJEE v.
NLRB, 382 U.S. 366 (1966). On remand the Second Circuit consolidated two of
the three cases, dismissing the third. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 358 F.2d 292 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3138 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1966) (No. 341). It should
be noted that throughout this protracted litigation there has yet to be a decision on the
merits. Pending disposition on appeal, however, the company has adhered to its policy
of holding nothing back for "concessions," although some modifications of company
proposals were made in the 1966 GE-IUE negotiations.
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company agrees to it.2 The question which has never been conclu-
sively decided, however, is whether such bargaining is legal when
the company refuses to meet with a coalition committee and the
unions attempt to force the issue. It is precisely this question which
arose in McLeod v. General Elec. Co.,3 a test case involving GE
and the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE). It is
the purpose of this Note to analyze the McLeod case, the legal argu-
ments of both sides, the economic factors underlying this new at-
tempt at collectivization, and to present some tentative conclusions
as to the legality of coalition bargaining in varying factual contexts.
I. THE TEST CASE - MCLEOD V. GENERAL ELEC. CO.
In recent years, leaders of the many unions dealing with GE
have become increasingly concerned over what they consider to be a
disparity of bargaining power between the company and the repre-
sentatives of its employees. GE bargains on a national scale with
only three of the eighty-odd unions with which it maintains con-
tracts,4 the IUE, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
(UE), and the Pattern Makers' League. The practice has been to
negotiate national contracts with these three unions, supplemented
by local agreements designed to cover special local problems and
conditions. For this purpose, the IUE traditionally elects a national
conference board, comprised of members of both the international
and local unions, which in turn elects a negotiating committee of
from ten to fifteen members to meet with GE representatives and
establish the national contract.'
General Electric bargains on a decentralized basis with all the
remaining unions, executing only local contracts based upon a pro-
gram formulated by the central New York office. Although local
employee relations managers are empowered to make minor adjust-
ments in company proposals to cope with local situations, the basic
"package" is dictated and closely controlled by the central office,
and serious deviations are forbidden.6 The final result is almost
2 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 705 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 2 LAB.
REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 2065 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 1966), rev'd per curiam, 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 3243 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1967) (Nos. 645 & 774).
8257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 2065 (2d
Cir. Sept. 8, 1966), rev'd per curiam, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3243 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1967)
(Nos. 645 & 774).
4 Id. at 693.
5 Ibid.
6 Id. at 694.
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complete uniformity in the proposals offered to the various local
unions throughout the country, a result made feasible due to the fact
that almost all union contracts with GE terminate on the same
date."
Union leaders have severely criticized GE's bargaining policy,
claiming that the disparity in bargaining power between a closely-
supervised industrial giant and a small local union leads to one-
sided bargaining and a virtual dictation of the terms of employment
by GE. To alleviate the situation and to adopt a coordinated ap-
proach in the impending 1966 negotiations with GE and Westing-
house, AFL-CIO President George Meaney in October 1965, called
a meeting of representatives of the eight most prominent unions in
the electrical products field.' This conference produced the Com-
mittee on Collective Bargaining which in turn named a Steering
Committee' to study existing contracts and formulate a set of uni-
fied national goals on wages and working conditions."0 At the an-
nual AFL-CIO convention in December, a resolution was adopted
pledging the unions' full support to the efforts of the Committee on
Collective Bargaining.
On March 15, 1966, the eight cooperating unions produced a
pamphlet entitled "Program for Progress," which set forth a unified
7Ibid.
8 Ibid. The eight unions were the IUE, the International Association of Machinists
(IAM), the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers
(UAW), the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the American
Federation of Technical Employees (AFTE), the Sheet Metal Workers International
Alliance (SMWIA), the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW), and the American Flint
Glass Workers (AFGW). Of these, the IUE was by far the dominant union, repre-
senting approximately 80,000 of the company's total worker complement of 290,000.
Post-Hearing Brief for Respondent, p. 10, McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp.
690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). By contrast the LAM, the next most prominent union in terms
of number of employees represented, was certified as bargaining agent for only 12,900
employees. At least one commentator has hinted, however, that the coalition was really
dominated by the UAW, with whom the IUE has contemplated a merger. Northrup,
Boulwarism v. Coditionism - The 1966 GB Negotiations, 5 MANAGEMENT PERSON-
NEL Q. 2 (1966).
9 2 5 7 F. Supp. at 694-95.,
10 Post-Hearing Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 12-13. Although GE stated in
its brief that this was the first time the AFL-CIO had ever formed such a committee, Mr.
Northrup indicates the coalition committee was formed for the 1960 negotiations, under
the leadership of IUE President Phillip Carey. This coalition fell apart, however, when it
became obvious that Mr. Carey was determined to call a strike against GE. All the other
members signed individual contracts with the company, and only a few locals of the
IAM and the AFIE followed the IUE out on strike. See Northrup, supra note 8. The
1966 coalition, on the other hand, was highly publicized as was the work of the com-
mittee on collective bargaining, and the eight unions constantly stressed the unity concept.
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
demand for improvements in nine specific contract dauses." The
document ended with a "Resolution on Unity," which attacked the
divide-and-conquer policies of the GE and Westinghouse bargaining
leaders and resolved to meet the companies with a unified bargain-
ing front of the eight member unions."2 At the same time, the first
of a series of publications entitled "Unity" was distributed to GE
and Westinghouse workers, with a promise that more issues would
be published from time to time to keep workers informed of progress
in the eight-union bargaining drive."3 Later, during the course of
"grass roots" strategy meetings between local union leaders and
members of the committee, GE charged that several prominent
persons affiliated with the Committee had specifically pledged that
"no union [of the eight] would sign a contract unless all signed."' 4
Shortly after the formation of the Committee on Collective Bar-
gaining, the Steering Committee sent a telegram to GE's bargaining
chairman, Phillip D. Moore, raising certain pension and social se-
curity issues. The response to this telegram indicated the approach
GE was going to adopt toward the eight-union unified effort. Mr.
Moore replied:
We note that your telegram listed the names of several repre-
sentatives of other unions. However, this telegram is addressed to
"1 The nine clauses included three economic clauses dealing with wages, holidays
and vacations, and income and employment security. The other improvements de-
manded were a full arbitration clause without restrictions, a full union shop, an anti-
discrimination clause, an improved pension and insurance program, and continuity of
service and automation security provisions. 257 F. Supp. at 696 nnA & 5.
12 Id. at 696-97.
13 Id. at 697.
14 Ibid. GE made two specific accusations along this line. The first was that Local
320 of the IUE had distributed a handbill with the following message for its member-
ship: "Despite the Company's efforts to confuse you, the eight unions dealing with
General Electric still are abiding and will abide by their unity resolution, and that is
for no one to sign a contract with General Electric until all parties sign." Post-Hearing
Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 27.
During the hearing, GE also called as a witness a reporter for a Ft. Wayne, Indiana
newspaper, who attributed a similar oral statement to John Callahan, chairman of the
IUE's General Electric Conference Board and Negotiating Committee. 257 F. Supp.
at 697. Despite this evidence, however, Judge Frankel found that there never was any
agreement, express or implied, among the cooperating unions that none would sign a
contract unless all signed. He further stated:
It was tacitly understood that before any of [the unions) ... abandoned
any of the agreed "national goals," they would inform and consult with each
other. The cooperative arrangements were instinct with the objective of ap-
proaching, as nearly as possible, the kind of unitary stance respondent regu-
larly took vis-a-vis the several unions. But each union retained the "au-
tonomous" status affirmed in the AFL-CIO resolution of December 1965, so
that each was free at all times to sign with respondent on terms it deemed
acceptable for its members. Ibid.
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you as a representative of the MUE since we do not bargain with
their unions at the national level. We assume, of course, that these
gentlemen will continue to be in touch with their respective local
union officials who in turn are always free to discuss appropriate
matters covered by their local contracts with local management. 5
Further correspondence between Mr. Moore and Mr. Callahan,
the WUE representative, discussed the feasibility of preliminary bar-
gaining meetings to ascertain the aims of both sides prior to the
onset of formal negotiations in August 1966. One of these letters
from GE was answered by the eight-union coalition proposing pre-
negotiation meetings between GE and the Steering Committee. GE
remained firm, however, and replied that it would talk only with
the WUE and did not want to foster the "illusion" that it would bar-
gain jointly and nationally with the other seven unions." On March
25, 1966, GE's President, Fred J. Borch, telegraphed a flat rejec-
tion of the Committee's request for a meeting with the coalitionY
Thereafter the IUE demonstrated a marked change in its attitude
toward coalition bargaining. In a letter to Mr. Moore dated April
13, 1966, Mr. Callahan expressed disappointment that the company
would not meet with the joint Committee, but he announced that
the TUE was ready for informal meetings between its own negotiat-
ing committee and the GE team. The company readily agreed, and
an IUE-GE conference was scheduled for 10 a.m. on May 4 at the
company's offices.
When the GE committee entered the conference room, it was
confronted with an UE committee which included one member
from each of the other seven unions with which GE had specifically
refused to meet. IUE spokesmen later stated that although none of
these seven "members" had voting power, their presence was neces-
sary "to give the benefit of their experience in negotiating with
[GE to the IUE] ... and to supply adequate inter-union communi-
cation as a means of avoiding the 'whipsawing' [GE] was thought
to have accomplished in the past."18
5 Id. at 698.
16 Id. at 699. A second letter was sent to David Lasser, Chairman of the Steering
Committee, in which Mr. Moore protested the coalition approach of the unions and
stated: "We are not responding to your Steering Committee's two recent letters because
by doing so it might create the mistaken impression that national bargaining with local
bargaining units is in effect, this is dearly not the case nor do we believe it should be."
Ibid.
17 Id. at 700.
Is Ibid.
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According to a hastily conceived plan,'9 Mr. Moore stated that
he "'must have come to the wrong meeting,' "20 that he "would not
be a party to 'coalition bargaining,"', and announced that the meet-
ing was adjourned until 2 p.m., at which time he would meet with
the IUE committee if it would expunge itself of the seven objec-
tionable members. As the union insisted it had a right to choose
the members of its own bargaining committee, no further meetings
were held.
Both GE and the IUE thereafter filed unfair labor practice
charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).22 The
IUE charged that GE had violated sections 7, 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(5)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA)2" by refusing to
bargain with the IUE committee after May 4, 1966.24 After re-
jecting GE's complaint and largely because of the complexity of the
charges, the NLRB decided to petition under section 10(j) of the
LMRA25 for a temporary injunction requiring GE to bargain.2"
The injunction hearing before Judge Frankel of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York lasted
four days. At the close of the evidence, Judge Frankel granted the
injunction, holding that the company had no lawful basis in fact
for refusing to bargain2 7  After a special session of the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of Judge Frankel," the
19 Some of the members of the IUE committee appeared at the meeting prominently
displaying lapel buttons which identified them as members of other unions. When
this was reported to Mr. Moore, he held a quick strategy meeting with his committee,
which decided that it should not meet with a union committee which included the
seven outsiders. The committee was advised by counsel that this maneuver by the
unions was a blatant attempt to take advantage of the NLRB's recent ruling in American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 60 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1965) (appeal to 6th Cir.
pending), discussed in text accompanying notes 45-51 infra. The committee appar-
ently concluded it should disregard the decision, which was deemed unsound by GE's
counsel. 257 F. Supp. at 700-01.
20 Id. at 701.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 703.
2 3 LMRA § 7, 8(a) (1), (5), as amended, 61 Star. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§
157, 158(a) (1), (5) (1964).
24 257 F. Supp. at 692.
25 LMRA § 10(j), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964).
26 257 F. Supp. at 690.
27 Id. at 706.




Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reversed the decision of the
Second Circuit."
Although the basic question of the legality of coalition bargain-
ing in the GE-IUE case must now be decided by the NLRB, Judge
Frankel did much of the spadework in formulating the issues and
unearthing prior case lavW on the subject. One basic problem, how-
ever, left unanswered by the opinion was whether, and on what
basis, coalition bargaining could ever be illegal. The court never
discussed this problem, except to explain briefly the actions the
unions could have taken which would have been concededly law-
ful."0 Judge Frankel stated that even if the court could assume
coalition bargaining would be illegal under certain circumstances,
the GE committee had not remained at the bargaining table long
enough to gain any evidence of an illegal union conspiracy to force
coalition bargaining on the company. Judge Frankel stated that the
union had the right to choose its own committee members, and that
the company could not object except under exceptional circum-
stances81 not present in the instant case. He also asserted that the
law welcomes repentance82 and would uphold the right of the IUE
to change its mind as to the propriety of coalition bargaining and
that the "change of heart ' 3 by the IUE must be accepted as sincere
at the outset. The presence of other union members on the IWE
committee was not considered to be sufficient to dispell the belief
that the union had abandoned its earlier position on coalition bar-
gaining; the walkout by the GE negotiators was "premature"8 4 and
amounted to a refusal to bargain.
2 9 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 35 U.S.L WEEK 3243 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1967) (Nos.
645 & 774).
80 See 257 F. Supp. at 704, where Judge Frankel stated the following:
Thus, there is no contention that it was wrong for the several unions deal-
ing with a single enterprise to consult together. Nor is it intimated that the
unions offended the law - or behaved questionably in any pertinent sense -
when they succeeded in formulating and unanimously endorsing a set of
common goals ... on matters like wages, seniority, holidays, and the like.
... It is no less permissible for unions so situated to share research, personnel,
ideas, and information. They are allowed, in short, to assist each other and
discover if possible areas of agreement, of "unity," and of mutual support in
dealing with the unified, unitary, centralized management they confront.
31 Id. at 703-04.
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1. THE MCLEOD CASE IN RETROSPECT
Aside from the basic question of whether coalition bargaining
can ever be illegal, 5 the McLeod case seems to present two main
issues: (11) Was the company relieved of its duty to bargain by vir-
tue of the fact that it found the composition of the union's commit-
tee highly objectionable? and (2) Do the facts of the case present
a situation in which the courts can infer a conspiracy that would
have the unions "locked in" so as to force coalition bargaining on
an unwilling company?
A. Objection to Union Committee Members
Ostensibly, the right of a bargaining party to choose its own
committee members would seem to be absolute. Section 7 of the
LMRA states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining ... .36
Its counterpart, section 8(b) (1) (B) 37 provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain
or coerce "an employer in the selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances."3  Based on the language of these sections, it is the general
rule that a party to collective bargaining is free to select the
members of its own bargaining committee, the other party being
unable to object or refuse to meet with such duly selected mem-
bers. 9
Like most general rules, however, this one is not truly "absolute
35The McLeod decision did not deal with the question of whether coalition bar-
gaining would be illegal had the unions, in fact, been "locked in" in an agreement to
force coalition bargaining upon the company. The court's opinion that labor unions
are free to discuss contract matters among themselves and to assist each other in the
formulation of common goals, has led at least one authority to conclude that there is
nothing illegal about coalition bargaining. See News & Background Information,
62 LAB. REL. REP. 343 (Aug. 22, 1966). This analysis of the opinion is unfortunate,
as the court never decided whether forced coalition bargaining would be unlawful.
a6 LMRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
37 61 Star. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1964).
38 fLAl §8 (b) (1) (B), 61 Star. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B)
(1964).
39 Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Roscoe
Skipper, Inc., 213 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1954); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 60 LR.R.M. 1385 (1965).
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or immutable."4 The first case to fashion an exception was NLRB
v. Kentucky Util. Co.,4 wherein the company refused to bargain
with a former employee, fired by the company, and now working
for the union. The employee had openly expressed deep hostility
toward the company, and, in addition, had expressed the hope that
the Tennessee Valley Authority would run it out of business;"
furthermore, his testimony before the NLRB in a previous unfair
labor practice charge had been completely discredited.44 The union
had in fact promised the company that their ex-employee, Braswell,
would not be on its negotiating committee. The court felt that
under these circumstances, the company was relieved of its duty to
bargain upon finding Braswell a member of the-union negotiating
team. The court stated that the presence of Braswell in the nego-
tiations would reduce them to mere "sham" or "surface" bargaining
with a feeling of deep distrust on both sides and cited several previ-
ous decisions as illustrative of the fact that the LMRA does not re-
quire useless bargaining with no possibility of reaching an agree-
ment.
4 5
Another switch in loyalties, this time by a former union em-
ployee, led the Third Circuit to sanction a refusal to bargain by the
union in NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Workers.46  The
employee arriving at the bargaining table to represent management
was a former union man with considerable inside knowledge of
union bargaining tactics and policies. He was introduced by the
employer's association "tauntingly and laughingly,"47 as if the asso-
40 NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, 274 F.2d 376, 378 (3d Cir.
1960).
41182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950).
42 Id. at 812.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
4 5 The court cited Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1947) and NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) as standing for the propo-
sition that the statutes do not require useless bargaining and that an employer may be
relieved of the duty to continue negotiating with the union when conditions indicate
that future negotiations will be useless. But see NLRB v. Sunrise Lumber & Trim
Corp., 241 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957) and NLRB v. Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952) which, when read together, hold, in effect,
that a certainty on the employer's part that bargaining will become futile or lawless
is no excuse for refusing to bargain.
46 274 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1960). The case turned on the point that an offer to
bargain through such a patently objectionable representative was not an offer to bar-
gain in good faith.
47 Id. at 379.
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ciation, by hiring him, had "put one over" on the union.4 8 The
court reversed an NLRB order to the contrary49 and held that under
such circumstances, the union was relieved of its duty to bargain
since it would be "in form only without good faith negotiating on
the other side."50
These decisions must be contrasted with the later decision of the
Sixth Circuit in Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB5 and the NLRB decision
in American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.52  In Standard Oil
the company was negotiating new contracts at each of four separate
Ohio refineries. In order to insure greater uniformity in negotia-
tions, the international union53 included on its bargaining team at
each refinery representatives who were neither the regular interna-
tional representatives nor members of the local union. The com-
pany negotiators objected to the inclusion of these "outsiders" in the
union committee and refused to bargain until they left.54 The court
held that the company committed an unfair labor practice by re-
fusing to meet with the union committee55 and rejected a company
argument that this was nothing more than a clandestine attempt to
achieve centralized industry-wide bargaining, a proposal the com-
pany had previously rejected. 6 The general rule that a party has
the right to choose its own bargaining representatives was held to
control, since there was no evidence that the union was trying to
achieve anything other than plant-by-plant bargaining.57 The court
declined to express any opinion on whether or not a delegation of
bargaining authority by the local to the international union would
be an unfair labor practice.5
48 Ibid.
49 Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1959).
50 274 F.2d at 379.
51322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
52 60 L.R.RM. 1385 (1965).
53 The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union. Petitioner in the
action was Local 11-395 of this union.
54 322 F.2d at 42.
55 ld. at 44.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
5 8 The case actually involved two charges - one against Standard Oil Co. and one
against the union. The basis of the charge against the union was that it had failed to
bargain by refusing to sign a contract at one plant after agreement had been reached.
The trial examiner found that the local union was acting on orders from the interna-
tional, that it had therefore ceded its bargaining authority to an organization which
was not the statutory bargaining representative of the employees, and that such action
was a refusal to bargain on the part of the local union. The NLRB affirmed, but on
the grounds that a delay in signing a contract until negotiations were successfully con-
[Vol. 18: 575
COALITION BARGAINING
The ink had scarcely dried on the Standard Oil opinion before
the NLRB extended it to justify a union's inclusion of members of
other unions in its bargaining committee. In American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp.,5" several unions, in an attempt to gain
solidarity in negotiations with a multi-plant employer, formed a
steering committee to conduct negotiations for all of them.6" When
the company refused to meet with this committee, the most promi-
nent union in the "coalition" announced that it would meet sepa-
rately with the employer to discuss individual contracts at each
plant.6" As in McLeod, however, the union's bargaining committee
included representatives from the other unions, with whom the em-
ployer again refused to meet.
The NLRB found that the refusal to meet with the union com-
mittee was an unlawful refusal to bargain.6" The Standard Oil case
was held to control, absent any "bad faith or ulterior motive" 4 or
"unusual or exceptional circumstances,"" the same two exceptions
recognized in the earlier case.66 The Board could find no such
exceptions in American Radiator which would transcend the union's
right to choose its own bargaining representatives.6"
It is readily apparent that if the American Radiator decision is
upheld on appeal,6" it will be decisive precedent in a situation such
as that presented by McLeod. Indeed, GE made no attempt to dis-
tinguish American Radiator, but attacked it as an unsound extension
of the Standard Oil case.6" There are factual differences in the two
cluded at other plants was simply an unlawful delay and amounted to a refusal to bargain.
Standard Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
Since the court accepted the Board's rationale, it said: 'We do not need to decide in
this case that any sort of provision for approval delegated by bargaining representatives
to an international union or council is unlawful, nor do we." 322 F.2d at 45.
5 9 60L R.R.M. 1385 (1965).
6O ld. at 1386.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Id. at 1386-87.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 322 F.2d 40, 44 (6th Cir. 1963).
67 60 L.R.R.M. at 1386-87.
68 The case is now pending review in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
6 9 In its Post-Hearing Brief for Respondent, McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F.
Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), GE did not mention the Standard Oil decision, a fact which
Judge Frankel noted with disapproval. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690,
704 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). On appeal, however, the company cited American Radiator
as an unsound extension of Standard Oil. Brief Before the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals for Respondent-Appellant, pp. 66-67, McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 358 F.2d
292 (2d Cir. 1966).
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cases, the most obvious being that in Standard Oil the outsiders sit-
ting in on negotiations were only the representatives of the parent
international union, whereas in American Radiator they were mem-
bers of other unions. Nevertheless, Judge Frankel found that in
both previous cases the courts had rejected an employer's position
"indistinguishable in principle from the one pressed here.""0 Cases
such as NLRB v. Kentucky Util. Co.7 were rejected as being
"quaint" or "extreme."72
If all the cases which have condoned an employer's refusal to
bargain with an objectionably constituted union committee can be
classified as unusual or extreme cases, then that would appear to be
the end of GE's argument. There is, however, a thread of reason-
ing running throughout Kentucky Util. and NLRB v. International
Ladies' Garment Workers" that appears to have been ignored by the
courts which later distinguished the cases as being "extreme."
Granted that the fact situations were extreme, the decisions in these
cases turned not upon whether a party has a right to choose its own
representatives but upon the effect that forcing the company repre-
sentatives to bargain with a contemporary they found patently ob-
noxious would have upon the bargaining process.4 If such a meet-
ing would result only in mutual distrust and a frustration of the
basic policy of the LMRA to promote meaningful contract negotia-
tion, then the company would be relieved of its duty to bargain. 5
Thus in Kentucky Util. the rights of the parties to choose their own
representatives were subordinated to the policy of the act to promote
meaningful bargaining. The same reasoning was used to uphold a
refusal to bargain by the union in the Garment Workers' decision.7"
7 0 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
7' 182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950).
72 257 F. Supp. at 704.
73 274 F.2d 376 (3d Cit. 1960).
74 NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, 274 F.2d 376, 378 (3d Cir.
1960); NLRB v. Kentucky Util. Co., 182 F.2d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 1950).
7 5 NLRB v. Kentucky Util. Co., supra note 74. The pertinent language of the
court is as follows:
Collective bargaining is a two-sided proposition; it does not exist unless both
parties enter the negotiations in a good faith effort to reach a satisfactory
agreement. Mere lip service to the obligation on the part of the employer
has been condemned often by the Courts.... Just as collective bargaining in
form only and lacking in substance has been condemned, certainly collective
bargaining in form only without good faith negotiating on the other side
should not be required. Id. at 813.
76 The court in Garment Workers quoted and emphasized the language of the
Kentuacky Util. court. See 274 F.2d at 378.
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The reasoning of these cases has been considered by the courts
in situations where the objection to bargaining was for reasons other
than distaste for the personal representatives. Thus, in Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co.," the NLRB held that an employer could lawfully
refuse to bargain with a union conducting a rival business, because
the very existence of such a dual relationship on the part of the
union
created a situation which would drastically change the climate
at the bargaining table from one where there would be reasoned
discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations upon
which good faith bargaining must rest to one in which, at best,
intensified distrust of the Union's -motives would be engendered.78
Again, it was the effect that requiring negotiation in such an atmos-
phere would have upon the bargaining process rather than the
union's conducting a rival business which relieved the company of
its duty to bargain. The Bausch & Lomb story also has a sequel.
In NLRB v. David Buttrick Co.,70 the company's objection to bar-
gaining was that union pension funds had been utilized to finance
a rival manufacturer. The court felt that it was not the connection
of the local union agent with the pension fund which gave rise to
the difficulty, contrary to what the NIRB had said,"0 but the "inter-
relationship of powers and temptations created by the Fund's loans
to a competitor... which gives rise to the problem, without regard
to the circumstances leading to the existence of the loans."'" A
situation was thus presented in which the employer's refusal to bar-
gain might be justified."2
77108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
78Id. at 1561. (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Even though there
was no evidence of unfair advantage being taken by the union in negotiations prior to
their disruption, the court held that the temptation to do so relieved the employer of
his duty to bargain. Id. at 1562.
70 361 F.2d 300 (lst Cir. 1966).
80 David Buttrick Co., 60 L.RMM. 1181 (1965), remanded, 361 F.2d 300 (1st
Cir. 1966).
81361 F.2d at 304. (Emphasis added.) The court reached the following pertinent
conclusions with regard to the conflicts of interest question:
(1) [I]t is the innate danger to be guarded against; . .. (3) [S]uch a
danger, if proximate enough, without evidence of present abuse, can poison
the collective bargaining process by subjecting every issue to the questioning
of ulterior motives... (5) [I]he keystone freedom required on the part of
a local union seeking to become an exclusive collective bargaining agent is
the freedom to conclude such bargaining negotiations free of the suspidon
that it is motivated by any purpose other than its loyalty to the employees
it represents. Id. at 307.
82 Id. at 308-09. The case was remanded to the NLRB for further fact-finding as
to the potential for conflict of interest.
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Viewed in this light, the facts of the McLeod case take on a new
hue. If the overriding principle is not so much the rights of the
parties to choose their own representatives as it is the promotion of
meaningful bargaining, the facts of the GE-IUE dispute would seem
to place it more within the ambit of Kentucky Util. than that of
Standard Oil and the other cases relied on by the union.8 There is
a very real danger that an order forcing an unwilling company to
bargain with a coalition of unions which it opposed would foster a
spirit of mistrust on the company's part and would tempt the com-
pany to engage in "sham" or "surface" bargaining while attempting
to gain additional evidence that the unions were in fact "locked in"
by an agreement to force coalition bargaining. Such an atmosphere
could not conceivably be conducive to a meaningful settlement of
disputes over contract terms. Although a breakdown in negotia-
tions is not an inevitable result of the McLeod situation,84 it is the
temptation to engage in surface bargaining which thwarts the policy
of the LMRA.85 Since the right of a party to collective bargaining
to choose its own negotiators has never been held to be absolute, 6
it would seem logical that this right should give way to the LMRA's
overriding policy of promoting meaningful bargaining and agree-
ments. Nor are the-IUE's reasons for including the "outer seven"
in its bargaining committee particularly impressive. The IUE had
many capable negotiators of its own, and it is doubtful that the
experience and consultation of bargainers from other unions would
substantially aid the IUE committee if it was truly engaged in bar-
gaining only for an IUE contract. If outside consultation was nec-
essary, it could, as the court suggested, readily be obtained by com-
paring notes away from the bargaining table.8
Furthermore, the presence of eight separate unions in one com-
mittee presents a substantial danger of a conflict of interests. One
8 3 NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963); American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 60 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1965).
84 In fact, the IUE and GE successfully concluded their negotiations with a contract
in October 1966. News & Background Information, 63 LAB. REL. REP. 163 (Oct. 24,
1966). The meetings were fraught throughout with mistrust, however, and final agree-
ment was not reached until the negotiators were brought to Washington to bargain
under the surveillance of federal mediation. There were also isolated strikes such as
the one at GE's jet-engine plant in Evandale, Ohio, which was halted by an eighty-day
Taft-Hartley injunction. Ibid.
85Cf. NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 361 F.2d 300 (1st Cit. 1966); NLRB v. Ken-
tucky Util. Co., 182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950).
86 See, e.g., NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, 274 F.2d 376 (3d
Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Kentucky Util. Co., supra note 85.
8 7 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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group of workers may seek more in wages and benefits than an-
other, particularly if the disparity in working skills between the two
groups is substantial. Representation disputes and inter-union rival-
ries and disputes could conceivably replace contract negotiation as
the chief issue at the bargaining table. In short, there was simply
no valid reason for including members of other unions in the IUE
committee except for the bare collective bargaining right of a party
to choose its own committee members. When this right conflicts
with the development of an atmosphere of mutual trust and con-
fidence necessary in any meaningful bargaining arrangement, it
should give way. It is this policy of the LMRA which seems to have
been forgotten in American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,88
and McLeod v. General Elec. Co.,8" and it is for this reason that
the results reached in both cases are questionable. Both will be
watched with great interest on appeal."
B. Applicability of Conspiracy Doctrine
Although the facts of the McLeod case may relieve the company
of its duty to bargain with the coalition committee, they do not, in
the writer's opinion, present a situation in which the courts should
resort to a conspiracy doctrine applicable to criminal and antitrust
cases in order to infer an illegal agreement on the part of the unions
to force coalition bargaining on an unwilling company. Again, the
overwhelming argument against hasty resort to conspiracy doctrines
is the policy of the LMRA to encourage meaningful collective agree-
ments in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence. In the McLeod
case, GE argued that the extensive pre-negotiation activities of the
eight unions promoting "Unity," the inclusion of other union mem-
bers on the IUE committee after the coalition position had ostensibly
been abandoned, and the fact that the unions continued to publicize
the unity concept after they had supposedly abandoned the coalition
approach, all showed a continuing conspiracy by the unions to force
coalition bargaining on the company.9 The company claimed that
direct proof of a lock-in agreement was unnecessary.92 Instead, it
88 60 LR.R.M. 1385 (1965).
89 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
90 As already mentioned, the American Radiator case is now pending review in the
Sixth Circuit. McLeod, on the other hand, was remanded to the NILRB for a decision
and -will in all probability ultimately return to the Supreme Court.
91257 F. Supp. at 704. Post-Hearing Brief for Respondent, pp. 61-67, McLeod v.
General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
92 Id. at 61.
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relied upon the teachings of antitrust cases to assert that an illegal
agreement could be inferred from the actions of the unions both
prior to and during the single meeting." GE quoted from Eastern
States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States"4 that "conspiracies are
seldom capable of proof by direct testimony and may be inferred
from the things actually done."'95 It also cited Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,9" an antitrust case in which the Su-
preme Court found that a price-fixing arrangement existed between
distillers by virtue of the fact that all liquor manufacturers had
refused to sell their products to plaintiff unless a floor was placed
under retail sales and that all the manufacturers had simultaneously
imposed maximum resale price restrictions on purchasers of their
products. Finally, the company emphasized the recent lockout case
of American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB' as standing for the proposi-
tion that an employer contemplating a lockout to combat an im-
pending strike was not bound to rely upon assertions by union offi-
cials that no strike would be called until all work on ships in dry-
dock had been completed. 8
The reliance on antitrust conspiracy doctrines seems both unfor-
tunate and misplaced. The conspiracy doctrines are utilized to infer
agreements between parties engaged in violating the law where
93 GE's brief, id. at 61-66, cited the following cases in support of its conspiracy
argument: United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v.
Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph B. Seagram
& Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914); Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir.), revsd on other
grounds, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States,
219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
94 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
95 Id. at 612.
96 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
s7 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
98 GE emphasized only the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg, Brief for
Respondent-Appellant, pp. 51-54, McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 2 LAB. REL. REP.
(63 L.R.R.M.) 2065 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 1966); and its attempt to bring its own situa-
tion within the teaching of this case by analogy is not persuasive. The analogy used
is obvious: if the employer in American Ship Bldg. did not have to heed the reassurances
of union officials that a strike would not be called, likewise GE officials did not have
to listen to the IUE's assurances that it was only going to negotiate for its own contract.
However, the distinctions between the two cases are too great to allow for such far-
reaching analogies. For instance, the tactic used by the employer in the American Ship
Bldg. case was a lock-out, a legitimate economic weapon which is not inconsistent with
the duty to bargain; GE, on the other hand, broke off talks completely - a dearly un-
fair labor practice unless justified by some illegal union action. Secondly, the em-
ployer in American Ship Bldg. was motivated in his actions by the threat of severe
economic loss if the strike was called while ships were in his yards for repair. GE had
no such economic reasons for refusing to bargain.
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there is no direct evidence of the agreement. To carry these doc-
trines over into the field of labor relations, where so much depends
on the mutual trust and confidence of the parties, would be disas-
trous to the policy of the LMRA. Collective bargaining laws are
geared to cooperation, not prohibition. It is true that the unfair
labor practice sections of the LMRA 9 prohibit certain activities on
the part of both labor and management, but there are no criminal
or monetary penalties for violations of these sections; the only sanc-
tion is a cease and desist order.' 0 It is readily apparent that the
purpose of the unfair labor practice sections is to remove impedi-
ments in the way of meaningful bargaining, not to punish violations
of laws which express public policy. To afford the bargaining
parties the right to infer a conspiracy from the other's actions could
hopelessly mire the bargaining process in a series of charges and
counter-charges.
Moreover, from the facts of the McLeod case, there would
appear to be nothing clandestine about the activities of the eight
unions or the Committee on Collective Bargaining. Their goals and
activities were widely publicized. As Judge Frankel stated, the
unions could have carried out a conspiracy much more effectively
by not insisting upon each other's presence at the bargaining table,
and "conspirators are normally more conspiratorial."'' The judge
found that, in light of the professed desire of the UE to abandon its
position on coalition bargaining, the background events concerning
unity of the unions faded into obscurity, and there was simply not
enough evidence to show a lock-in agreement or infer a conspir-
acy.0 2 The decision effectively foreclosed the company's conspiracy
argument, but the overriding factor would seem to be that judges
should be slow to speculate with conspiracy doctrines in such a
delicate area of public concern and national interest as collective
bargaining.
99 .MRA § 8, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
100 LMRA § 10 (a), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964).
The only provisions in the LMRA for recovering damages by reason of an unfair labor
practice relate to § 8(b) (4) of the act, dealing with such extreme situations as "Hot
Cargo" clauses and jurisdictional representation disputes which force an employer to
shut down involuntarily. An employer can recover damages in any district court of the
United States for pecuniary loss suffered through violation of this section without
regard to jurisdictional amount. See LMRA § 37, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964). Of course, the Board also has temporary injunction reme-
dies, but these are discretionary and are rarely used. LMRA 5 10(j), 61 Stat. 146.
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964).
391 'McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
102 Id. at 706.
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III. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN
COALITION BARGAINING
If the facts of the GE-IUE dispute were scrambled a bit, some
interesting questions, likely to remain unanswered by the ultimate
decision in the McLeod case, would appear. For instance, what
would be the result had the union insisted, as a bargaining condi-
tion, that GE recognize and negotiate with the eight-union commit-
tee? If the company had remained to bargain, are there any theories
under which coalition bargaining might be held to be illegal? And
assuming for a moment that it is legal, what would happen if one
of the unions tried to withdraw from the coalition either before or
after the onset of negotiations?
A. The Effect of an Insistence Upon Coalition Bargaining
In McLeod, Judge Frankel seemed to accept the hypothesis that
if the coalition had insisted that the company meet with it as the
representative of the unions, the unions would have committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain.' , Two cases were
cited as authority for this proposition' - NLRB v. Borg-Warner
Corp. "' and NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers.'
The rationale of both decisions was that certain subjects are "manda-
tory" subjects of collective bargaining as defined in section 8(d) of
the LMR.A.' As to these subjects, a party is free to insist that its
proposals be adopted, so long as there is no refusal to discuss them.
As to other subjects, not "mandatory" as defined in section 8(d) or
by court interpretation, a party cannot insist that the other side
adopt its proposals as a condition of bargaining, since to do so would
be a refusal to bargain about the mandatory subjects. 8 In Borg-
Warner, the company insisted that any negotiated contract must
103 Id. at 705, wherein the Judge said: "It is a minimum consensus in the case that
a party may seek such joint bargaining, and that the two sides could agree to have it,
though it may be unlawful to insist adamantly upon it or use coercion to achieve it after
the point of impasse."
104 Id. at 705 n.13.
105 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
106 266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1959).
10 7 LMRA § 8(d), 61 Star. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964)
defines the duty to bargain collectively as follows: "[T]he performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment... From the language, the terms, wages, hours, and conditions
of employment are referred to as mandatory subjects of bargaining.
108 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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include a "ballot" clause calling for a secret pre-strike vote by all
employees on whether to accept the company's last offer, and a
"recognition" clause calling for substitution of uncertified local af-
filiates for the NLRB-certified international union as parties to the
contract. The Supreme Court found that neither item was a man-
datory subject of bargaining as defined in section 8(d) of the
LMRA; 0 9 hence, insistence on their inclusion in the contract was
an unlawful refusal to bargain on the part of the company.
In the IBEW case, the situation was quite different. For several
years there had been a running feud between the IBEW and the
United Auto Workers (UAW) over certification as bargaining agent
for certain groups of workers within the employer's unit. The
UAW had traditionally won the battle, and the workers in question
were covered by the UAW contract with the employer, Texlite, Inc.
When it undertook to negotiate a new contract with Texlite, the
IBEW insisted that its contract should cover the workers already
included in the UAW contract. When the employer refused, the
IBEW negotiators discontinued talks. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld an NLRB order deeming such action an
unlawful refusal to bargain."' Refusing to bargain unless the em-
ployer recognized an improper unit was held to be a refusal to dis-
cuss the mandatory subjects outlined in section 8(d) of the act and
therefore constituted a refusal to bargain under section 8(b)(3).
To be sure, there are distinctions between the situations presented
in the above cases and union insistence upon employer recognition
of a coalition of unions as a bargaining unit. Recognition of the
coalition is not a subject of collective bargaining as were the ballot
and recognition clauses in Borg-Warner, nor was the coalition in-
sisting that the recognition be incorporated as a contract clause.
The Texlite dispute may be distinguishable on the grounds that the
IBEW was deliberately flouting the authority of the NLRB, since
the Board had already certified the UAW as bargaining agent for
the disputed workers, and the IBEW was attempting to force Texlite
to disregard the Board's certification. If, on the other hand, the
coalition had insisted on recognition by GE as a prerequisite to bar-
gaining, it would neither have been insisting on a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining, nor, if each union retained its autonomy,
would it have been insisting on the recognition of an inappropriate
109 See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1561-62 (1954).
110 NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1959),
enforcing 119 N.I..B. 1792 (1958).
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unit, although this is somewhat debatable."1  In principle, however,
the discussion in Borg-Warner would seem to control the question
of insistence on coalition bargaining. Insistence on anything which
would prevent the discussion of mandatory subjects is probably
within the scope of that decision wherein the Supreme Court said:
"[I]t is lawful to insist upon matters within the scope of mandatory
bargaining and unlawful to insist upon matters without ... .. 2
Insistence on recognition of the coalition as a prerequisite to bar-
gaining would effectively foreclose any negotiations if the company
was unwilling to grant recognition and it is unlikely that any court
would find that recognition of the coalition is a "mandatory" sub-
ject of bargaining within the meaning of section 8(d).
B. The Theories of Illegality
In McLeod v. General Elec. Co.,"' Judge Frankel specifically
found that GE's abandonment of bargaining was premature, so that
no conspiracy to force coalition bargaining was proven up to the
time of walkout by the company representatives. He also men-
tioned in passing that common consultation and formulation of a
common set of goals was a lawful right of cooperating unions, so
that "many of the things... [GE] stresses about the 'coalition' are
not suggested even remotely to have been unlawful or in any sense
improper."" 4  Since the decision turned entirely upon the premature
walkout, however, Judge Frankel never reached the larger issue of
whether or not the coalition would have been illegal if GE had
been able to prove the conspiracy and the lock-in agreement.
The question of whether or not true coalition bargaining is
illegal is one of statutory construction, as the LMRA nowhere ex-
pressly authorizes or forbids the activity. However, there are a
number of provisions in the act which might operate in an em-
ployer's favor if the coalition and the lock-in agreement were proven
facts.
(1) Illegality Under Section 7. - Section 7 of the LMRA" 5
provides that employees "shall have the right.., to bargain collec-
311 It is difficult to understand how a union could be bound in with others in true
coalition bargaining and still retain any semblance of autonomy. See the discussion
of this possbiility in text accompanying notes 114-17 infra.
112 NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
113 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"14 Id. at 704.
115 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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tively through representatives of their own choosing .... .""' If, in
a given fact situation, it becomes obvious that the coalition com-
mittee is not bargaining for a contract for the particular union rep-
resented but for a common contract for all the unions represented
on the committee, then it would seem that the employees are no
longer bargaining through representatives of their own choosing.
The will of the individual unions would be subordinated to the will
of the coalition. The individual union representatives would no
longer be free to accept an offer from management which they found
acceptable if any member of the coalition objected, and in effect
the employees would no longer be bargaining through representa-
tives of their own choosing. They would be bargaining through a
representative - the coalition committee - which they had not
chosen and with which they had had no dealings. Such a result would
be a circumvention of the rights of employees to choose their own
representatives under section 7 of the act. And, since section 8(b)
(1) (A)".. provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in
their exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7, a proven coali-
tion would probably be directly prohibited by the LMRA. This
appears to be the theory relied upon by GE in its unfair labor prac-
tice charge against the IUE which was rejected by the NLRB as
being without merit."'
(2) Illegality Under Section 8(b)(3).-The LMRA presents
another possible weapon for a frontal assault upon the use of coali-
tion bargaining by the unions. Section 8(b)(3)11 provides that it
is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to
refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, assuming that it is
the representative of his employees. All of the unions represented
on the disputed IUE coalition in McLeod were certified, either na-
tionally or locally, by the NLRB. It is quite possible that an agree-
ment, either express or implied, by these unions to delegate their bar-
gaining authority to a central coalition committee could be construed
116 Ibid.
117 LMRA 5 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Star. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1) (A) (1964).
118 The GE charge was based on the theory that by binding employees to an agree-
ment that none would sign a contract with the company until all had signed, the unions
had coerced and restrained the employees in the exercise of their rights under § 7 of
the LMRA. On July 13, 1966, petitioner McLeod wrote to GE that there was no evi-
dence on which to ground such a charge. 257 F. Supp. at 701.
119 LMRA § 8(b) (3), 61 Star. 140 (19 4 7), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b) (3)
(1964).
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as a refusal to meet and negotiate with the employer in, their indi-
vidual, certified capacity. Since section 9(a).2 of the act provides
that representatives elected or selected by the majority of employees
shall be their exclusive agents for bargaining with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, it seems
that evidence to the effect that the selected representatives had dele-
gated their authority to another body would be viewed in a dim
light by the NLRB. The facts in the McLeod case were not conclu-
sive, but the refusal-to-bargain section should be available to em-
ployers in a more concrete situation.
(3) Illegality Under Section 9.-Closely analogous to the sec-
tion 8 (b) (3) question, is the prospect of illegality under section 9121
of the act Although this section deals with representation and
elections and its violation is not an unfair labor practice as such,
union activities inconsistent with the requirements of the section
would probably relieve an employer of his duty to bargain. Section
9(a) provides that bargaining representatives must be chosen by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.'22
Whenever an employer disputes the representatives so selected, ei-
ther on the grounds they do not represent a majority of the em-
ployees or because of irregularities in procedure, an election hearing
is held, which is usually followed by a Board-supervised election;
and the Board has exclusive authority to decide in each case which
unit to designate and certify as the exclusive bargaining agent of a
group of employees. 2 ' These provisions relate to the coalition prob-
lem in the following manner: at some point during negotiations, it
will become obvious that the union committee members are not in
fact representing their own unions, but the coalition. With the
coalition thus substituted as bargaining representative, the employer
could probably suspend bargaining on two grounds: (1) The coali-
tion was never certified by the NLRB as the "unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining" as provided in section 9 (a);
and (2) The coalition may not represent a majority of the employees
of the company, necessitating a Board-supervised election to deter-
mine the coalition's majority status.
In such a situation, the Third Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Air
'120 L.MRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
121LMRA § 9, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
122 LMRA § 9 (a), 61 Stat. 143 (19 4 7), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1964).
123 LMRA § 9(b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
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Master Corp."' is persuasive. The case held, in effect, that where
there is a good faith doubt as to whether or not a union has been
repudiated by a majority of the employees, management does not
have to recognize it as bargaining agent, since to do so would have
an improperly coercive effect on the employees' right to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing.'25 In-
deed, it has been held that if an employer errs in his judgment of
the factual situation and affords recognition to the wrong union,
he will be guilty of committing an unfair labor practice.' Com-
mon sense dictates that it is only fair to suspend the employer's
duty to bargain until such time as his good-faith doubt as to the
union's majority status has been resolved. 2 And the same suspen-
sion of duty would be appropriate where an employer might enter-
tain good-faith doubts as to the majority status of a coalition, it
having become apparent that the coalition has in fact replaced the
individual unions as bargaining agent for the employees.
(4) Illegality Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(C).--Probably the
most direct language in the LMRA relating to the problem of coali-
tion bargaining is section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (C) 2 which provides that
it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents:
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is...
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bar-
gain with a particular labor organization as the representative of
his employees if another labor organization has been certified as
124339 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1964). See also NLRB v. Trosch, 321 F.2d 692 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964).
125 The question arose when the majority of the workers at Air Master Corp.
ousted the Seafarer's International Union on the eve of new contract negotiations and
chose the Teamsters as their new bargaining agent. The Seafarer's Union insisted that it
represented the employees, however, and when Air Master afforded de facto recognition
to the Teamsters, the Seafarer's Union filed unfair labor practice charges against it. The
court held that proof of disaffiliation in the case was dear, and the employer did not
have to recognize the ousted union's assertions in the fact of this evidence. The court
disagreed with the NLRB that just because the ousted union was the incumbent, an
employer cannot make an independent determination that it has lost support. Incum-
bency is not an indication that a change of affiliation is false or has been coerced.
NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954).
126 International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). But
see NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 .2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 296
F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1961).
12 7 NLRB v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 303 .2d 785 (5th Cir. 1962); St. Louis Inde-
pendent Packing Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961).
128LMA § 8(b) (4) (ii) (C), 61 Star. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. S
158(b) (4) (ii) (C) (1964).
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the representative of such employees under the provisions of sec-
tion 159 of this title.12 9
Although originally designed to prevent competition and strife
between competing unions, the language of this section would seem
to readily lend itself to coverage of the coalition situation in any
case where the coalition might attempt to force the employer to
recognize it through threats or coercion. Here the coalition in
effect defeats itself, because most or all of the unions represented
by it will be certified as exclusive bargaining representatives, either
nationally or locally, by the NLRB. Since the coalition is compet-
ing for recognition with its already certified members, it commits
an unfair labor practice if it attempts to force recognition through
threats or coercion.
The foregoing discussion of theories of illegality assumes that
the coalition committee has not taken the proper steps for recogni-
tion and certification by the Board. It is entirely possible, of course,
that a coalition could be selected as bargaining agent by a majority
of a company's employees and be properly certified by the Board as
their exclusive bargaining agent. In the absence of such procedures,
however, the coalition is running the risk that one or all of the
above-mentioned provisions in the LMRA will be brought to bear
against it.
C. The Problem of Withdrawal
If coalition bargaining receives legal sanction, problems are
bound to arise as to whether, and under what conditions, a union
can withdraw from the coalition. The problem parallels that of
the withdrawal of an employer or a union from a multi-employer
unit, a topic with which the courts and the NLRB have had consid-
erable experience. 3° Employers have found it to their mutual ad-
vantage to bargain together in multi-employer units since the advan-
tages of stabilized wage rates, hours, and conditions of employment
throughout an industry or a particular locality readily compensates
for any loss of autonomy which the employer might suffer in deal-
ing with his own employees. Unions, however, do not appear to
present quite the same solid front of interlocking interests. Truck
drivers, steel workers, office employees, guards, and other groups of
129 Ibid.
130 See, e.g., W. B. Johnson Grain Co., 60 L.R.R.M. 1117 (1965); Evening News
Ass'n, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965); Spun-Jee Corp., 59 L.R.Rd.M 1206 (1965); The
Kroger Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1964).
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employees present widely varied and occasionally competing goals
and demands; indeed, withdrawal could prove to be the biggest "fly
in the ointment" for coalition bargaining. Unless some guidelines
are laid down by the courts concerning the propriety of individual
union withdrawal from coalition bargaining, collective bargaining
could be reduced to a shambles, with large unions withdrawing
from contract negotiations at will, whenever their individual inter-
ests collide with those of the majority. The problem of union
withdrawal is intensified by the fact that the provisions of the
LMRA specifically outline the procedures to be followed in union
certification.' 1 Since two units cannot be certified to represent the
same group of employees if the coalition objects, withdrawal from
a certified coalition would seem to necessitate recertification by the
Board before the withdrawing union could legally represent its
members in individual bargaining.
In most other cases, however, the problem of union withdrawal
is closely analogous to the problem of employer withdrawal, and
the principles applicable in the latter situation would appear to be
equally applicable in union withdrawals. Accordingly, a brief look
at the problems caused by withdrawal from a multi-employer group
is appropriate.
The pioneer case establishing the right of a single union to
withdraw from multi-employer bargaining was Retail Associates,
Inc.'32 There it was held that the union, like any individual em-
ployer, can withdraw from a multi-employer bargaining unit by
giving timely notice prior to the date on which negotiatons for a
new contract or modification of an old one are to begin.' In the
later case of Evening News Ass'n' the NLRB reaffirmed the
principles of Retail Associates in holding that an employer who re-
fused to bargain with a union which had timely withdrawn from
a multi-employer group unless negotiations were conducted on the
prior terms committed an unfair labor practice."'s The Board said
131 LMRA § 9(c) (1), 61 Star. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1)
(1964).
132 120 NJ-R.B. 388 (1958).
133 Later cases have held that the same standards govern both employer and union
withdrawal from a multi-employer unit. Evening News Ass'n, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149
(1965); Truck Driver's Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). The Supreme Court in the latter case specifically re-
frained from deciding whether the same freedom to withdraw would be allowed to
unions as was allowed employees. Id. at 94 n.22.
134 60 L.R.RVL 1149 (1965).
135 Id. at 1152.
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that the fact that the union had engaged in multi-employer bargain-
ing for twenty-five years and had given no valid reason for its with-
drawal was immaterial; withdrawal was held to be an absolute
right, if done at an appropriate time."3 6
Subsequent cases have made it clear, however, that neither party
can withdraw from multi-employer negotiations after bargaining
for a contract has begun, without consent from the other side."'
Nevertheless, consent to withdrawal has been inferred, for example,
in the following cases: (1) where the union accepted without objec-
tion the employer's notification of withdrawal and attempted to
persuade him to sign the collective contract on an individual basis; 38
(2) where it consented to bargain with the withdrawing employer
on an individual basis after an agreement had been reached with the
association, failed to present the association contract to him for sig-
nature, and bargained freely with the remaining members;3 9 and
(3) where the union failed to object to the withdrawal and signed
an agreement which omitted the withdrawing employer's name as
a party to the contract' 4  The Board also held in one case that
union withdrawal was unequivocal and complete despite the fact
that the union, after withdrawal, outlined conditions under which
it would continue the multi-unit bargaining.'
Withdrawal is timely if it becomes effective after expiration
of the most recent union-employer contract' or before negotiations
for a new contract are commenced.'43 However, withdrawal shortly
after a union is certified by the NLRB,' or after filing of an elec-
tion petition between rival unions, 45 has been held to be untimely.
The only case in which withdrawal of a union from a coalition
committee appears to have been discussed is in the dissenting opinion
of Board member Brown in Evening News Ass'n.46 In that opin-
ion, Mr. Brown stated:
136 ibid.
137W. B. Johnson Grain Co., 60 L.R.R.M. 1117 (1965); Spun-Jee Corp., 59
L.R.R.M. 1206 (1965); The Kroger Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1964).
138C & M Constr. Co., 56 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1964).
139 Atlas Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 56 L.R.R.M. 1442 (1964).
140 Metke Ford Motors, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 950 (1962).
141 Evening News Ass'n, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965).
1 42 20th Century Press, 107 N.L.R.B. 292 (1953).
143 Reno Employer's Council, 1962 CCH NLRB 17571.
144 Southwestern Colo. Contractor's Ass'n, 59 L.R.RLM. 1600 (1965).
145 Dittler Bros., 132 N.L.R.B. 444 (1961).
146 60 LR.R.M. 1149 (1965).
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[O]ne could equate an employer participation in multiem-
ployer bargaining with a single union's engagement in muldunion
(e.g, through a Council) bargaining. Where a group of unions
representing different units of a single employer wish to consoli-
date, a single combined unit can be achieved only with the em-
ployer's agreement. Once a broad unit is established by mutual
consent, an employer could not refuse to bargain with the multi-
union group as the representative of his employees; and while the
question has never been decided, it may be that one of the unions
could, under the proper circumstances and with prescribed rules,
withdraw from the Council in order to seek an independent course
of bargaining with the employer. 147
Most of the above cases cited by analogy involved voluntary
bargaining by groups of employers and single unions or councils, in
which only the individual unions had power to sign a binding con-
tract. In these situations, the NLRB has been willing to sanction
withdrawal on both sides.' What the Board will do if a union
attempts to withdraw from a true coalition is a question which is,
as yet, undecided."'4
1V. THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNING OF
COALITION BARGAINING
Underlying the legal disputes over coalition bargaining, of
course, is the familiar struggle between unions and management
for more economic leverage in dealing with each other at the bar-
gaining table. It was this struggle which initially gave rise to
unionism, when workers realized they could not better their lot
individually in the era of the giant trusts. Later, when many of
the unions had grown to gargantuan stature, it was management
which was forced to band together in multi-employer bargaining
groups to achieve bargaining equality in terms of economic strength
and weapons.'. Coalition bargaining is but the latest development
in this twentieth-century power struggle.
As far as the IUE-GE type of coalition bargaining is concerned,
147 Id. at 1153 (dissenting opinion).
148 Frnis L. Bennett, 139 N.L.R.B. 1422 (1962); Indiana Limestone Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 697 (1962). Cf. General Motors Corp., 120 N!LB. 1215 (1958), where
the Board found that a long history of multi-plant bargaining between GM and the
UAW as exclusive representative militated against severance of the unit into small
craft-type units for each plant, which the union wanted. Contra, Radio Corp. of
America, 121 N.L.R.B. 633 (1958) (allowing the severence).
149Evening News Ass'n, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149, 1152-54 (dissenting opinion). For
a holding that two or more unions can constitute a "labor organization" within the
meaning of the act and be certified as such, see Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 130 N.L.R.B.
897 (1961). Correspondingly, if certified jointly, the employer should be able to
insist that they bargain as such.
150 The LMRA does not expressly allow multi-employer bargaining. However, in
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it is questionable whether the economic arguments advanced by the
unions in support of their proposal are really sound. The admitted
goal of the IUE coalition was more economic power through col-
lectivization, with the "big stick" threat of a national, industry-wide
strike that would paralyze GE plants throughout the country. Some
commentators believe that another goal of the unions in the coali-
tion tactics is to coerce governmen intervention."' The unions
have found that such intervention has worked to their advantage in
the past in that increased collective power with the threat of a
national strike will cause the government to enter into the disputes
more quickly in order to prevent the threatened injury to the public
interest and to secure continued production of vital defense supplies.
It has also been suggested that the unions have taken advantage of
a pro-labor NLRB to time their unfair labor practice charges to
opportune stages of negotiations so that the company will appear
to be the villain.'52 The writer has no comment on these theories
other than to say that it does not seem likely that government inter-
vention will work to the union's advantage in all cases. The union's
greatest weapon is the economic strike, and the government's pri-
mary interest is to prevent the use of this weapon. Government
intervention would thus be contrary to union interests where a strike
is contemplated.
As to the unions' basic economic argument, even if the McLeod
case is eventually resolved in favor of the IUE, it will do little to
increase the unions' advantage, for the end result will be that the
unions will only have gained the right to sit in on each other's
negotiations. Bargaining will still have to be conducted as a "round
robin" affair with the coalition representing each member union in
turn. And since GE bargains with the other seven members of the
IUE coalition on a local basis, the committee will probably have to
bargain for each local of its member unions in turn. It has been
indicated that the unions can already achieve their national objec-
tives through activities which are concededly legal.3 There is
nothing illegal about strategy planning and common consultation
between unions, nor is it improper for unions to formulate a set of
Truck Driver's Local 1449 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), the Supreme Court sanc-
tioned the Board's practice of certifying multi-employer units whenever expediency and
practicality showed they were the most desirable units.
151 See, e.g., Northrup, Boulwarisa v. Coalitionism - The 1966 GE Negotiations,
5 MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL Q. 2 (1966).
152 Ibid.
153 See note 30 supra.
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common goals and present identical demands to an employer."'
With these rights already guaranteed, the unions' insistence upon
sitting in on each other's negotiations seems to be a mere quibble,
at best a bare legal right which should be subordinated to the build-
ing of an atmosphere for meaningful collective bargaining under
the LMRA.
On the other hand, the insistence upon the right to sit in on
each other's negotiatiohis probably represehts the first step in a per-
vasive attempt by the unions to achieve true coalition or industry-
wide bargaining. If the unions succeed in this attempt, the next
step will undoubtedly be a demand by the "outer seven" that GE
bargain-with them on a national, rather than a local, scale. The
final demand, then, would be insistence by the unions that man-
agement recognize the coalition itself as the bargaining agent. The
economic implications of such a concentration of power on the
union's side of the bargaining table are enormous. Viewed in this
light, the resolution of this first step in the eventual climb to true
coalition bargaining becomes all-important, and the outcome will
probably depend upon the prevailing opinion of Board members
and federal judges as to whether coalition bargaining is detrimental
to the public interest.
Many commentators would lay the national labor problems at
the feet of irresponsible union power and excessive economic de-
mands.' Most would suggest, as a remedy, some means of har-
nessing union power through legal action. Some have suggested
that the most workable solution is to remove labor's exemption from
the antitrust laws 56 so that excessive concerted activities may be
prohibited as restraints of trade. Others have suggested that the true
solution lies in outlawing national unions and confining worker
organization to the plant or company level. 57 Finally, one group
of experts has implored the legislature to recognize the realities of
modern-day bargaining and increase government's power as the
third seat at the bargaining table. 5' None of these proposals seem
likely to succeed, if only for the fact that organized labor is probably
'54 Ibid.
155 See, e.g., Kutner, Due Process of Economy: Antitrust Control of Labor, 24 U.
PI. L. RBv. 1 (1962); McGuigan, Our National Labor Policy - Collective Bargain-
ing or Authoritarianism?, 14 LAB. LJ. 527 (1963); Timbers, The Problems of Union
Power and Antitrust Legislation, 16 LAB. LJ. 545 (1965).
156 See, e.g., Timbers, supra note 155; Kurner, supra note 155.
157 See, e.g., McGuigan, supra note 155; Kutner, supra note 155.
35 8 The proposals for increased government supervision usually take the form of
augmenting presidential powers of intervention and/or amending the Taft-Hartley
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strong enough at the present time to prevent any drastic diminution
of its power. Whatever the evils of the power confrontations in
collective bargaining, it is likely to remain the dominant method of
settling labor differences. However, it would not seem to be in
keeping with the public interest to increase labor's collective power
at this time by affording legal sanction to coalition bargaining.
Collective bargaining seems to work best where the bargaining
power on both sides is relatively equal, and a decisive tipping of
this balance in labor's favor would be likely to promote the type
of inflationary wage and contract settlements which the government
has been trying to prevent.
V. CONCLUSION
Coalition bargaining is the newest development in the field of
labor relations, one which currently allows other unions to "sit in"
with the IUe as part of that union's committee in negotiations with
GE. The legality of this new tactic, presently being tested by ap-
pellate federal courts and the NLRB in the American Radiator and
McLeod cases, is shrouded in doubt. Although there is no provision
in the Labor Management Relations Act dealing directly with coali-
tion bargaining, there are a number of sections which theoretically
might operate to forbid the practice, unless a coalition is recognized
as an appropriate bargaining unit and certified by the NLRB.
Economically speaking, a decisive increase in union bargaining
power does not seem to be in keeping with governmental goals of
halting inflation and sustaining the war effort. If the future of
coalition bargaining is uncertain, labor's interest in the outcome is
not; according to one estimate, union leaders in seventy-six separate
industries are awaiting the outcome in order to institute the practice
in their industries.' If the right of unions to sit in on each other's
negotiations is upheld, coalition bargaining will probably become
the pattern for union negotiations with large industry throughout
the nation.
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provisions. See, e.g., Fleming, Emergency Strikes and National Policy, 11 LAB. LJ.
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